THE KIGALI GENOCIDE

The Kigali Genocide Memorial Center was established in April 2004. Intended to mark the tenth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda murder. Located at the top of a hill with a view over Kigali, the center has a memorial gardens, a museum including three permanent displays, and the Geno- Rwandan Genocide Archive and mass graves containing the bones of more around 250,000 victims of the genocide who perished in and around the city of Rwanda.

Despite being situated on a neutral site, the museum was selected for its impressive position and its accessibility to the nation’s capital, as opposed to its significance to the Kigali Center aims to be the hub of Rwandan history and memory of the genocide. In this nation, which is not only still profoundly affected by the genocide’s damage Bruised by the genocide’s destruction but also ferociously putting leaving its history behind in a rush of development, the Kigali Center aims to be As a somber and permanent place of remembrance for both survivors and families, lies and a proactive participant in the post-genocide reconstruction of Rwanda.

Ethnic conflicts in Rwanda between the Hutu majorities began in April 1994 and a highly deadly genocide of the Tutsi minority broke out, killing over after around a hundred days, there were roughly 500 thousand and a million moderate Hutus and Tutsis have died. What first appeared to be the main socioeconomic divide between Hutu and Tutsi herders farmer was first subjected to colonization, which hardened him to actual racial differences.

The Tutsi, who were believed to be more aristocratic and closely linked to Europeans, were placed in control over the Hutu after it was discovered that the population was readily divided along lines that fit the popular racial theories of the time. As hatred among the Hutu simmered, the Tutsi dominated over the Hutu majority for years, enjoying privileges from their white sponsors.The Hutu “social revolution” in 1959 sparked ethnic unrest, and Rwanda gained independence in 1962. The majority of Rwandans and their Belgian colonizers supported the Hutu movement, which swept to power.

However, as the Hutu sought to atone for decades of Tutsi leaders’ repression, the “ethnic” divide hardened and Tutsi opportunities to hold positions of power were reduced.  The second half of the 20th century was characterized by periodic violence; pogroms against    Tutsis occurred every few years, and between 1959 and 1994, an estimated 700,000 Tutsis abandoned the nation and went into exile in Tanzania, Uganda, and the Congo (then Zaire).

The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of Tutsi rebels residing in Uganda, invaded the nation in an audacious and forceful call for all exiled Tutsis to have equal access to political, social, and economic opportunities as well as the right of return. The Hutu administration used the opportunity of the ensuing civil conflict to launch a massive propaganda effort aimed at persuading the populace that their Tutsi friends and neighbors were a threat to their existence.

 After meticulous planning spanning four years, the Hutu extremists used the inexplicable shooting down of the Hutu president’s jet over Kigali on April 6, 1994, as justification to launch a genocide against the Tutsi. The international community did little while Hutus, including fanatics, killed their friends and neighbors with machetes for three months. The genocide came to a stop in July when the RPF seized power in the nation, and Paul Kagame, who led it at the time, has remained in charge of Rwanda ever since.  Rwanda still struggles to come to terms with the horrific legacy left by the incredibly violent genocide. One of the main components of the endeavor to reconcile with the genocide.

It was established at the request of the Rwandan government, which was unsure of the most effective way to remember and reconcile with the genocide, under the direction of the British anti-genocide organization Aegis Trust.The Kigali Center represents the transnationalism of exhibiting atrocities through the memorial museum form and its spread to diverse cultures and contexts around the world.

It was inspired by the UK Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre, which was inspired by Yad Vashem and is now called the National Holocaust Centre and Museum. Because of this, the Kigali Center differs from a great deal of other Rwandan memorials, which are still unfinished scenes of massacres and murders, where graphic evidence of the genocide is on exhibit, including bodies and bones  and which act as places for their local communities to grieve and remember.

 Instead, the Kigali Centre actively interacts and uses memories of the genocide to educate visitors to prevent future genocide, and it ultimately wants to accomplish this on a national, regional, and worldwide scale, much like the memorial museums examined in this book and others throughout the world. It is understandable why Rwanda would need and want a memorial museum so soon after the genocide, if, as I have argued, political legitimacy today depends on accepting the past and memorial museums are one of the crucial mechanisms for legitimating nations or groups in the eyes of the international community.

It also clarifies Rwandans’ motivation for turning to the West in search of a method of remembrance that will not only honor the genocide but also instruct current and future generations and legitimize its fledgling democracy in the context of today’s regrettable politics. However, politics play a crucial role in the establishment of memorial museums, as I have also argued and as the US Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) and the House of Terror amply demonstrate. As such, the Kigali Center’s unique local and national politics, despite its transnational origins, cannot be disregarded.

The National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG) of the Rwandan government oversees the Kigali Center, which is run by the Aegis Trust, which also raises money for operations and manages the center on the government’s behalf. Because of the public-private cooperation and the fact that the Kigali Center is situated on government land, the government has significant influence over how the memorial honors the genocide.

Given that many contend that the current Rwandan government, a dictatorship by most accounts with a dismal record on human and civil rights (Reyntjens 2011), does not deserve the international political legitimacy that a memorial museum can help to bestow on a regime, the political use of genocide memory in Rwanda has the potential to be extremely unsettling. In a nation where those responsible for the genocide still reside next door to survivors, where justice and reparations have moved painfully slowly, and where the social divisions that led to the genocide have not been addressed, the Kigali Center aims to address the challenges of commemorating the genocide. The genocide-causing society has been pushed out of sight rather than remedied, and Kagame’s political authority and the fragile peace are upheld by the all-Tutsi government’s strict rule.

The Kigali Center’s lofty objectives of promoting tolerance and reconciliation and striving to prevent genocide are jeopardized by the political and social environment of genocide remembering in Rwanda. As one of the “official” sites of genocide remembrance, the Kigali Center’s genocide memory is actually highly political, serving as a symbol of the ways in which the current regime uses memory to justify its antidemocratic policies and further its political agenda at the expense of the victims and survivors.

Following the Genocide Even while Rwanda still evokes pictures of horrific murder and devastation, genocidal violence is seldom noticeable now, especially in Kigali, more than 20 years later. The rapid pace of growth has resulted in the destruction of numerous atrocity sites and the concealment of the devastation of events that occurred relatively recently, despite the Rwandan government’s efforts to turn the country around (Meierhen-rich 2009; 2010). Nowadays, Rwanda is regarded by many as one of Africa’s safest, most orderly, least corrupt, and cleanest countries.

Under the pretense of “national unity,” the administration has fervently attempted to move past the past and toward the future by officially “abolishing” ethnicity in Rwanda, asserting that there are just Rwandans and not Hutus or Tutsis. This obscures what is frequently an authoritarian, primarily Tutsi, and essentially undemocratic government and distorts the reality of Rwanda’s perilous position (Reyntjens 2004).

Furthermore, although the Rwandan government and a large portion of the international world applaud the “peaceful” coexistence of former perpetrators and survivors that is evident throughout the nation, this coexistence frequently results from the simple necessity of survival on an economic and geographic level.

 Divisions and anxiety similar to those that erupted in 1994 simmer under Rwanda’s façade of “national unity” (Buckley-Zistel 2006; Rettig 2008; Thomson 2011). Following the massacre, Rwanda saw widespread disarray and huge displacement. Fearing retaliation, up to two million Hutus left the country and settled in camps for refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); many more were killed by the Rwandan Patriot Forces (RPF) as they invaded the nation and put an end to the genocide.

Over a million Rwandans were internally displaced, and over 500,000 Tutsis who fled the nation between 1959 and 1994 were invited back by the triumphant RPF administration for their exhibits of atrocities (Reyntjens 2004). As thousands of Hutu refugees perished and the Rwandan interahamwe4 harassed the populace, unrest simmered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. After Hutu refugees perished in the disgusting camp circumstances, the recently formed Rwandan government began the task of reconstructing a nation that lay in ruins.

The West solidly supported the winning RPF and its American-trained commander, Paul Kagame, as foreign aid flowed in, “driven by an acute guilt syndrome after the genocide” (Reyntjens 2004, 179). The Tutsi government has, however, consolidated its hold on power over the last 20 years. This was made abundantly clear in August 2010 when Kagame won 93 percent of the vote to win a second seven-year term. Later, he changed the constitution to allow him to run for a third seven-year term, which he did in August 2017 with over 98 percent of the vote, demonstrating that he is in fact turning into just another African strong man.

Researchers have found that in Rwanda, the official policy of unity, which is supposed to ease ethnic tensions, instead makes matters worse by creating a forum for candid conversation about the country’s ethnic divisions (Buckley-Zistel 2006; Rettig 2008).

Many Hutus bitterly oppose the government and RPF for taking political control and failing to acknowledge their own violations of human rights, while many Tutsis only back the government because they fear another genocide; nevertheless, neither group is able to openly express their concerns (Thomson 2011; Buckley-Zistel 2006).

Additionally, there’s the worry that “emphasizing the absence of ethnic identities has become a means of masking the monopoly of military and political power by Tutsi” and that this has made it possible for the “Tutsization” of authority in the nation (Bradol and Guibert, cited in Reyntjens 2004, 187). Put differently, the government functions mostly as a “dictatorship in the pretense of democracy,” but is endorsed and pushed as a democratic system by a large portion of the global society (Reyntjens 2004, 177).

Apart from the alarming anti-democratic inclinations of the Tutsi government and the post-genocide issue of justice, Rwanda has additionally tensions between different ethnic groups. Packed with almost 100,000 individual when charged with genocide-related offenses, the International Criminal Tribunal ICTR Bunal for Rwanda and Rwanda’s dysfunctional legal system were unable to perhaps aim to give them all a fair trial. To try to go over this issue, the Rwandan government determined in 2002 that the great majority of those charged would go to trial in a provincial or local gacaca.

The gacaca over 1.2 million cases were tried in the operation that ran until May 2012 in more than 12,000 gacaca that are based in the community. Traditionally, gacaca were used to settle conflicts locally and were designed to administer restorative justice rather than punitive justice (Rettig 2008).

Memorial sites of the Genocide: Nyamata, Murambi, Gisozi and Bisesero

The Genocide Memorial Sites at Nyamata, Murambi, Gisozi, and Bisesero Armed militias known as Interahamwe massacred an estimated one million people in Rwanda between April and July 1994. These militias mostly targeted Tutsis, although they also killed moderate Hutus and Twa people.

This series property, consisting of four memorial sites, honors the victims of the genocide.

A Catholic church constructed in the Nyamata hill in 1980 and a technical school established in the Murambi hill in 1990 were two of the component sections that were the sites of atrocities. Over 250,000 victims are interred at the Kigali Genocide Memorial, located on the Gisozi hill in Kigali City, and at the Bisesero hill in the Western Province, which is home to a memorial constructed in 1998, to remember the fight of those who resisted their perpetrators for over two months before being exterminated. Description is available under license CC-BY-SA IGO 3.0 Memorial sites of the Genocide: Nyamata, Murambi, Gisozi and Bisesero Memorial sites of the Genocide: Nyamata, Murambi, Gisozi and Bisesero Outstanding Universal Value Brief synthesis.

The memorial sites of the Genocide:

Nyamata, Murambi, Gisozi and Bisesero witnessed key events in the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda, which claimed the lives of more than one million people over 100 days between April and July 1994.

Although the origins of the genocide can be traced back to ethnic differences which the colonial powers framed as political identities, the event has acquired universal significance because of its sudden intensity – the number of people killed in a relatively short space of time – and the way it was carried out – the premeditated and organized extermination of civilians by their neighbours, family members and militias.

In addition, the genocide led to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994-2015), which contributed to the process of creating the International Criminal Court (2002), as well as to the United Nations General Assembly’s decision, in 2003, to designate 7 April as International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, in a bid to encourage a commitment to the fight against genocide worldwide.

The four memorial sites represent more than 200 places of worship, public places and places of resistance in Rwanda where massacres were committed, and encourage reflection and reconciliation, while playing an educational role in promoting a culture of peace and dialogue.

Two of the component parts of the property still bear traces of the massacre:

 The Nyamata Catholic Church, built in 1980 on the hill of the same name in the Eastern Province, and the Murambi Technical School, built in 1990 on the hill of the same name in the Southern Province.

The third site, Gisozi hill in the city of Kigali, where more than 250,000 victims have been buried, is home to the Kigali Genocide Memorial built in 1999, while the fourth site, Bisesero hill in the Western Province, hosts a memorial built in 1998 to remember the fight of those who resisted their attackers for more than two months before being exterminated.

Criterion (VI): The memorial sites of the Genocide:

Nyamata, Murambi, Gisozi and Bisesero are of Outstanding Universal Value because of the sudden intensity of the genocide, the scale of the massacre perpetrated against the Tutsis over 100 days and the extermination of civilians by family members, neighbours and militias.

 All these factors prompted the United Nations General Assembly in 2003 to designate 7 April as the International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. He four memorial sites represent more than 200 places of worship, public places and places of resistance in Rwanda where massacres were committed. The Nyamata Catholic Church and Murambi Technical School are direct and tangible reminders of the genocide sites, the burial site on Gisozi hill reflects the scale of the tragedy, and Bisesero is associated with the struggle of those who resisted.

Integrity

The integrity of the memorial sites of the Genocide: Nyamata, Murambi, Gisozi and Bisesero lies in the ability of the attributes to convey Outstanding Universal Value, namely their completeness and intactness. The attributes are included within the boundaries of the four component parts, but an inventory of the main attributes would make it possible to establish a baseline for the conservation and management of the property.

The integrity of the main building of the former church in Nyamata, preserved in the state it was in immediately after the massacres, is at risk from natural deterioration due to the construction materials, as well as from urban development due to its location.

The integrity of the collections of movable heritage and of the evidence of the genocide The mummified remains, skulls, and personal belongings of the victims that have been preserved inside the building components are extremely susceptible to environmental influences.

Genuineness
The veracity and trustworthiness with which the characteristics communicate the exceptional universal value constitute the foundation for the property’s authenticity. The school buildings are intact and the collections in both cases powerfully depict the horrors of the killings, but the church buildings preserve a high degree of authenticity because their materials, form, and design have remained as they were at the time of the atrocity.

 Reports on the history of the Tutsi genocide have been inclusive and varied. Testimonies from survivors of the genocide have been gathered in order to chronicle their experiences throughout the time of persecution.In order to comprehend the political or social methods and circumstances that motivated the genocide criminals to slaughter their fellow countrymen, Testimonies from the Righteous have been gathered in order to comprehend their reasons for resisting at the most perilous periods for themselves and their loved ones.

Elders and sages have been consulted in order to comprehend the historical background of the hatred that gave rise to the genocide. Interpretation of the four component parts’ representation of all the genocide places in Rwanda not only advances knowledge of the genocide’s historical and geographical backdrop, but also of the reasons should be reinforced for why its mode of operation has drawn interest and concern from the global community.

Requirements for management and protection

The Ministerial Order No. 001/MINUBUMWE/24 of 08/02/2024, which governs the classification of tangible cultural heritage and the conditions for its use and revenue generation, and Law No. 28/2016 of 22/7/2016, which addresses the preservation of cultural heritage and traditional knowledge, both safeguard the four memorial sites. Law No. 09/2007 of 16/02/2007 on the mandate, organization, and operation of the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide and Law No. 15/2016 of 02/05/2016 governing ceremonies to commemorate the genocide against the Tutsi and organization and management of memorial sites for the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi also protect the four component parts. Genocide (CNLG), which was superseded in 2021 by the Prime Ministerial Order No. 021/03 of 21/10/2021, which established the Ministry of National Unity and Civic Engagement’s (MINUBUMWE) mission, remit, and organizational structure.

The CNLG’s responsibilities were also taken over by the Ministry of National Unity and Civic Engagement (MINUBUMWE); the national policy on the fight against genocide, its ideology, and the management of its consequences, formulated in 2014; and Organic Law No. 04/2004 of 08/04/2005 on how to protect, safeguard, and promote the environment in Rwanda, which forbids the dumping of any substances likely to destroy sites and monuments of scientific, cultural, tourist, or historical interest. Additionally, a component on preserving the memory of has been included in a national policy on national unity and civic engagement.

Commemorating the Tutsi genocide, in addition to the creation and upkeep of the Memorial sites for the Genocide and archives, such as those of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Gacaca courts. Currently, a strategy plan is being drafted. According to Prime Ministerial Order No. 011/03 of July 24, 2023, which outlines the Ministry of National Unity and Civic Engagement’s goals, authorities, and organizational structure, the Ministry of National Unity and Civic Engagement (MINUBUMWE) is in charge of managing the four memorial sites. With the assistance of government-provided material, financial, and human resources, MINUBUMWE oversees and maintains these locations.

Every location has its own managers, who are subject to civil servant regulations and are in charge of protecting the site on a daily basis. The 2023–2028 plan is one of the regularly updated management plans that act as strategic instruments for capacity building through mechanisms that involve local communities in the planning, management, and protection of the sites, as well as for managing, safeguarding, and monitoring the individual components of the serial property. Incorporating heritage impact evaluations into buffer zone and property-wide planning processes is crucial.